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RECENT DECISIONS
state. Nonetheless the majority relied on a Colorado case as though it lent
support to its position.
It would appear that the majority of the court has invaded the legis-
lative domain in rendering this ultra-liberal decision. The only way the
majority could have reached this result, since there can be no dispute that
polio is a disease, was to ignore altogether the provisions of a relatively ex-
plicit statute. In addition it upheld a finding of causal relation upon show-
ing of a mere possibility.
In direct response to the instant case the 1961 Session of the Montana
Legislative Assembly amended R.C.M. 1947, § 92-418, to read as follows :"
"Injury" or "injured" means a tangible happening of a trau-
matic nature from an unexpected cause, resulting in either external
or internal physical harm, and such physical condition as a result
therefrom and excluding disease not traceable to injury. (Em-
phasis supplied).
This statutory declaration repudiates the instant case and narrows the
sweep of the Act, possibly excluding both exposure and exertion cases from
coverage. The liberal holding in the instant case, by precipitating this
legislative reaction has in the final analysis diminished rather than ex-
panded workmen's rights under the Act.
KENNETi R. WILSON
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REFERENDUM REQUIRES Ap-
PROVAL OF GOVERNOR BEFORE SUBMISSION TO ELECTORATE.-A proposed con-
stitutional amendment, passed by the Montana Legislative Assembly, would
have created a separate Board of Regents for the general control and super-
vision of the University of Montana. The proposal was not submitted to
the governor for his approval. A proceeding was brought in the Supreme
Court of Montana to restrain the secretary of state from expending public
funds to publish the proposed amendment. A temporary restraining order
issued. The Montana Supreme Court, after a hearing on the merits, made
the injunction permanent. A proposed constitutional amendment must,
under the Montana Constitution, be submitted to the governor for his ap-
proval or rejection before A ii pre ' uted Lo the people. State ex rej. Liv-
ingstone v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1960) (Justice Angstman con-
curring specially).
Relator attacked the constitutionality of the proposed amendment on
two grounds: first, that it contained two separate and distinct subjects
course of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally result there-
from) ; CoLO. REv. STAT. 1953, §§ 81-2-1 to -8 (no attempt to define Injury) ; CAL.
LAB. CoDE ANN. § 3208 (Deering 1953) (injury includes any injury or disease aris-
ing out of employment).
"Laws of Montana 1961 ch. 162.
1961]
1
Radonich: State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1960
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
which were not separately stated in the title as it was proposed for the of-
ficial ballot; and second, that a constitutional amendment, proposed by the
legislature in the form of a referendum,1 must be submitted to the governor
for his approval or rejection. The court addressed itself primarily to the
second ground and held the proposed amendment invalid.
Article V, section 40, of the Montana Constitution directs that
Every order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both
houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment,
or relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two
houses, shall be presented to the governor, and before it shall take
effect be approved by him, or, being disapproved, be repassed by
two-thirds of both houses, as prescribed in the case of a bill.'
The provisions of the constitution are expressly made mandatory and pro-
hibitory.' Assuming that a constitutional amendment referendum is an
"order, resolution or vote," within tie meaning of article V, section 40,
the court read these two provisions together and declared that the referen-
dum had to be submitted to the governor.
This decision answered in the affirmative a question of first impression
in Montana, i.e., whether it is necessary to submit a proposed constitutional
amendment, in the form of a referendum, to the governor for his approval
or rejection. The court cited authority for a strict and literal interpreta-
tion of the constitution to prevent one department of the government from
transgressing the responsibilities and prerogatives of another department.'
It speaks as though the result at which it arrives is inevitable from such a
rule of interpretation. In fact, however, the matter is not so easily solved.
The assertion, on the one hand, that the constitution provides that the gov-
ernor must sign all orders, resolutions or votes is balanced by the argu-
ment, on the other hand, that the provisions of article XIX, section 9, are
just as mandatory and prohibitory. Article XIX, section 9, specifies the
steps in amending the constitution and should also be strictly and literally
interpreted to prevent one department of the government from trans-
gressing the responsibilities of another department. There is the further
consideration that article XIX, section 9, being a special provision controls
over general provisions.!
Article XIX, section 9, sets out four steps in the amendment process:
a proposal by two-thirds of both houses of the legislature; entry on their
respective journals; publication of the proposal; and ratification by the
people. Nothing is said of approval by the governor.
1A referendum is defined as a method of submitting an important legislative meas-
sure to a direct vote of the whole people. BLACK, LAw DIcrIoNARY (4th ed. 1951).
The people also have a referendum power by which they may compel a law to be
placed on the ballot. This is done by signed petitions of 5 per cent of the voters.
MONT. OONsT. art. V, § 1. When the word referendum is used herein, it is not used
in this latter sense.
'The procedure required for the passage of a bill is provided for in article VII,
section 12.
'MONT. CoNsT. art. III, § 29.
'Instant case at 558.
[Vol. 22,
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As a matter of governmental policy there is not the same need for the
governor to pass upon a constitutional amendment or legislative matter
which is to be submitted to the people by referendum, as there is for him to
pass upon a measure which is to become effective as law without reference
to the people. There would be nothing wrong with requiring approval by
three separate powers-legislature, governor, and people-if that were the
intent of the constitution, but neither is there any special advantage in
having the matter go through the governor's hands when both the legis-
lature and the people will have considered it.
The supreme courts of California, Colorado and Pennsylvania have
held that the governor has no right under their constitutions to interfere
with the amendment process.' His signature on an amendment proposal
is unnecessary. In each of these states the constitutional provision describ-
ing the amendment process is similar to article XIX, section 9, of the
Montana Constitution, requiring approval by two-thirds of both houses of
the legislature; entry on their respective journals; publication; and rati-
fication by the people.' Though California lacks it, Colorado and Penn-
sylvania also have provisions similar to article V, section 40, requiring
the governor to sign every order, resolution and vote which must be passed
by both houses of the legislature In spite of this he Montana Supreme
Court characterized the Montana Constitution as uhique and stated that
"decisions from other jurisdictions construing their state constitutions or
the federal constitution have little value or weight here."' If the Montana
Constitution is dissimilar to those of Colorado and Pennsylvania in pro-
visions relevant to the issue here, it is only in its express statement that
provisions are to be understood as mandatory or prohibitory unless clearly
otherwise. This same rule, however, is a general rule of constitutional in-
terpretation ordinarily held applicable even when not expressly set out.10
And in any event the rule is just as applicable to article XIX, section 9,
limiting the steps in amending the constitution to the four there set out
as it is to article V, section 40, establishing the governor's role in the
passage of legislation.
If the reference of the court to the uniqueness of the Montana Con-
stitution is taken seriously, the implication is that a slight variation of
language in compared provisions will render the decisions of other states
construing the similar provisions valueless. This implication is contrary
to usual constitutional interpretation and thus unlikely to be followed in
the future. It indicates, however, that the court approached the solution
of his very important problem of amending the constitution with eyes
partly closed.
Although the Montana Constitution has from its beginning required,
in article XIX, section 9, that proposed constitutional amendments be
5Ibid. See 16 C.J.S. Conitutional law § 25 (1956).
'llatch v. Stoneman, 66 Cal. 632, 6 Pac. 734 (1885) ; Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441,
36 Pac. 221 (1894) ; Commonwealth v. Criest, 196 Pa. 396, 46 Atl. 505 (1900).
"ompare MONT. CONST. art. XIX, § 9, with CALIF. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (1879),
COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 2, and PA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
8See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 39; PA. CONST. art. III, § 26.
'Instant case at 557.
"
0See 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS 159-164 (8th ed. 1927).
1961]
3
Radonich: State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1960
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
submitted to the people for their approval, the provision for the initiative'
and referendum of statutory measures now contained in article V, section
1, which expressly excludes any right of the governor to veto such meas-
ures, was not added until 1906.' Since the governor can not disapprove
the measure, presumably his signature is unnecessary or, if necessary, is a
mere ministerial step which could be omitted without infringement on any
real right of the governor.1' This provision, article V, section 1, was not
cited by the majority, yet it is important in characterizing the referendum
process as one not requiring the interposition of the governor.
Ultimately the authority of all three branches of state government
comes from the people; it is they who through the constitution have dele-
gated their sovereign power. The Montana Supreme Court has given ex-
pression to this :'
When the legislative assembly proposes an amendment to the con-
stitution it "is not in the exercise of its legislative power or any
sovereignty of the people" that has been intrusted to it, but is
merely acting under a limited power conferred upon it by the peo-
ple to make such a proposal. . . . The constitution does not pre-
scribe the method which shall be pursued in submitting such a
proposal. It may be by bill or by joint resolution, but in either
event it is a mere proposal, and does not become effective until
ratified by a vote of a majority of the electors at the polls.
When a legislative measure or constitutional amendment proposal is sub-
'The initiative is defined as the power of the people to propose bills and laws and
to enact or reject them at the polls, independent of the legislative assembly. BLACK,
LAW DiCTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). The power of the initiative resides only in the
people. A measure is initiated by signed petitions of 8 per cent of the voters.
MoNT. Cowsr. art. V, § 1. The initiative is legislative in character and performs
a positive function because the people are actually proposing a bill for the elec-
torate to pass on, whereas the referendum is executive in character, being a veto
power the same as the governor exercises because the people either approve or dis-
approve of a legislative enactment. Each power is complete within itself.
'2The term "measure" apparently does not include proposed constitutional amend-
ments. Such proposed amendments are expressly excepted out of the operation
of article V, section 1.
It is interesting to note that there has been a seventy year practice in Montana
of submitting the proposed constitutional amendment to the governor. Instant case
at 557. Although it recognized that this practice was not conclusive upon it, the
court felt that the practice was persuasive. Perhaps the reason that this practice
was not followed here was because the legislators for the first time feared that the
governor might.attempt to veto an amendment proposal.
'$For cases indicating that a substantial compliance with certain provisions of article
XIX, section 9, is sufficient, see State ew rel. Hay v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 142
Pac. 210 (1914) ; State v. McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 Pac. 1095 (1904) ; and Tax
Commission Case, 68 Mont. 450, 471, 219 Pac. 817, 822 (1923), which states that
"it is a fundamental canon of construction that a Constitution should receive a
liberal interpretation, especially with respect to those provisions which were de-
signed to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizens." In State ex rel. Hay
v. Alderson, the court said that even though article III, section 29, says the pro-
visions of the constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, the provisions of article
XIX, section 9, respecting publication of a proposed amendment, is referable to the
rule of substantial rather than literal compliance. In the Hay case, the publication
requirement was met in only two-thirds of the counties. In some of the remainlng
counties, from ten to twenty-three days intervened between the date of the first
publication and the day of the election; in others publication was made only once
a week in a daily paper and, in one instance, there was publication only in alter-
nate issues of a semi-weekly paper.
"Tax Commission Case, 68 Mont. 450, 465, 219 Pac. 817, 819 (1923).
[Vol. 22,
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mnitted to the people there can be little concern with the separation of
powers. But if there is still concern for the ideal of a system of checks
and balances, it inheres in the right of the people,' instead of the executive,
to reject a proposal of the legislative assembly. Tlhe Montana court has
stated :'
In express words, section 12 [article VII] provides that "every
bill passed by the legislative assembly shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it
and thereupon it shall become a law." Can it be doubted, then,
that by the use of the words in this amendment [article V, section
1], "The veto power of the governor shall not extend to measures
referred to the people by the legislative assembly or by initiative
referendum petitions," the power so to reject an enactment was
intended to be as effectual to annul such Act as veto of it by the
governor?
Cooley, in his work, indicates that "a proposed amendment which has
duly passed the legislature does not require to be passed upon by the gov-
ernor before it can be submitted to the people."'7  The result of the instant
case is to give the governor a veto power over constitutional amendment
proposals even though he has none over a referendum measure to enact
or amend statutes. This is contrary to the basic theory of the constitution
as to the responsibility and participation of the people in law making and
is not required by a fair interpretation of all the relevant provisions of
the Montana Constitution.
JOHN N. RADONICH
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION CLAIM DENIED FOR FAILURE OF CLAIMANT
TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF ACCIDENT TO PROPER PERSON.- A miner
wrenched his back loading coal just before going off shift, and required
hospitalization for several days. About a week after the accident, while pick-
ing up his paycheck, he allegedly told one Clark, who was then working in
the employer's office, that he had suffered injury in the mine. Claimant's
wife corroborated this testimony, but Clark denied recollection of such con-
versation. The employer resisted a claim for workmen's compensation on the
ground that the claimant had failed to give the employer notice of the
accident within thirty Uays therteu, as requireu by suiaue. Tne Industrial
Accident Board denied compensation on the ground that no actual know-
ledge of accidental injury existed on the part of the employer or any
""The two important, vital elements in any constitutional amendment are the as-
sent of two-thirds of the legislature, and a majority of the popular vote. Beyond
these, other provisions are mere machinery and forms. They may not be disre-
garded, because by them certainty as to the essentials is secured. But they are not
themselves the essentials." Id. at 474, 219 Pac. at 823.
'State ex rel. Esgar v. District Court, 56 Mont. 464, 470, 471, 185 Pac. 157, 159 (1919).
"1 COLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 87 (8th ed. 1927).
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 92-807. (Hereinafter REVIsED CODES OF MON-
TANA are cited R.C.M.)
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